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ABSTRACT 
Three large reciprocating compressors in H2 makeup service had 
been a chronic reliability problem for 30 years. Unit revisions 
greatly compounded this issue by eliminating builtin spare 
capacity. A Root Cause Analysis Team was chartered to address the 
reliability problem. Results achieved by this study essentially 
eliminated production losses (which had peaked at over three 
million dollars), improved valve life from three to six months to 
two to four years, and decreased maintenance costs by factors of 
three to five (several hundred thousand dollars per year). 
This paper describes the overall root cause analysis study of 
these compressors and presents the conclusions and recommenda­
tions. It also details one phase of the analysis, evaluation of a 
specific valve failure, in order to permit the reader to follow the 
rigor utilized in the application of this type of analysis process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Team was chartered by 
process unit management at Shell's Norco Refinery, to investigate 
the causes and provide solutions for the poor historical reliability 
of its three reciprocating hydrogen makeup compressors, K-1926, 
K-1927, and K-2179. 
Prior to 1994, poor compressor reliability had manifested itself 
in terms of higher than desired maintenance costs, as only two of 
the three compressors were required to meet production rates. In 
1993, compressor availability was: 
• K-1926 = 87 percent 
• K-1927 = 66 percent (impacted significantly by a main bearing 
failure) 
• K-2179 = 96 percent 
Following a unit upgrade in early 1994, the reliability problems 
began to cause significant production losses in addition to 
maintenance costs. The production losses peaked at over three 
million dollars in 1994. Maintenance costs peaked at over six 
hundred thousand dollars in 1994. 
The "prevailing mindset" was that these machines had 
"typical" poor reciprocating compressor reliability and probably 
had to be replaced or augmented by additional machines to 
improve this reliability. There had been unnumbered hardware 
changes made to these machines in efforts to improve the 
reliability. It was obvious that the standard problem solving 
approach had not worked. 
In order to address this complex, long lived problem; a root 
cause analysis study was performed. A multidiscipline team was 
assembled and proceeded to analyze the performance problems. 
The process chosen was to select several specific incidents (in late 
1993 and early 1994) for which solid data were available and 
which appeared to cover the spectra of problems. The incidents 
selected for detailed analysis were: 
• K-192 6 main bearing failure-March 5, 1994 
• K-1927 first stage valve failure-April 15, 1994 
• K-2179 first and fourth stage valve failure-May 16, 1994 
• K-1927 third stage rider band/ring failure-March 26, 1994 
• K-1926 first stage crosshead failure-October 6, 1993 
• K-1926 third stage packing case leak-June 6, 1994 
The set of reports generated by this analysis process is quite 
comprehensive and detailed. As an example of the rigor and detail 
used in the analysis procedure, more detail of the second incident 
(K-1927 first stage valve failure-April 15, 1994) is included as 
the APPENDIX of this paper. 
Causes were identified for each incident and then compared and 
correlated to determine common causes. Solutions were defined 
and evaluated using a rating criterion, and final recommendations 
were presented to site management. Many of the recommendations 
were implemented with rather spectacular results (when compared 
with past performance). The study required a sum of 
approximately one man-year from the participants spread over an 
eight-month calendar period. 
This paper describes root cause analysis application to this 
reciprocating compressor reliability problem. 
COMPRESSOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Process Unit Overview 
The processing unit in which these compressors were located 
converts gas oils from the three major process units into fuel oils, 
such as jet fuel and unleaded gasoline. Separated hydrogen from 
the two conversion stages is continuously recycled to the reactor 
feed furnaces by recycle compressors K-1928 and K-1929. 
Compressors K-1926, K-1927, and K-2179 provide makeup 
hydrogen for both stages to replace the hydrogen not recoverable 
from the product. High purity hydrogen (88 percent to 96 percent) 
from the makeup compressors is supplied to each stage at 1950 psi 
and 250°F. Any reduction in hydrogen flow from the makeup 
compressors negatively impacts both stages of the unit and limits 
total production capability. 
The makeup compressors draw hydrogen primarily from a 
hydrogen plant, which purifies the low purity hydrogen (80 percent 
to 85 percent) to a final purity of approximately 96 percent. When 
the hydrogen plant is down, the compressors draw all their feed 
directly from the off-gas header. Throughout the history of the unit, 
the hydrogen plant has been up and down for long periods for 
various financial reasons. 
Compressor System Overview 
The three reciprocating compressors in hydrogen makeup 
service are Dresser-Rand (Worthington) Model BDCs identified as 
K-1926, K-1927, and K-2179. K-1926 and K-1927 are identical 
three stage machines that were installed during the initial plant 
construction in 1967 as primary and spare. Unit capacity increases 
in 1981 led to the parallel installation of K-2179, a four-stage 
compressor. From 1981, full capacity operation of the unit was 
possible with two of the three compressors in service. A 
debottleneck of the unit in February 1994, now requires all three 
machines in service for full capacity operation. 
K-1926 and K-1927 are parallel, four cylinder compressors (size 
171/z I 171/z I 151/z I 11 x 18) with three stages of compression and 
a capacity of 36 mm scfd. The compressors have two first stage 
cylinders, one second stage cylinder, and one third stage cylinder. 
6000 hp, 277 rpm synchronous motors drive the compressors. 
Since the original design intended the compressors to operate as 
primary and spare, they share common systems such as knockout 
pots and intercoolers. These common systems were designed for 
one compressor operation, i.e., either K-1926 or K-1927 in 
operation separately. 
K-2179 is a four cylinder compressor (size 24 I 171Jz I 13 I 11 x 
18) with four stages of compression and a capacity of 37.4 mm 
scfd. A 6000 hp, 277 rpm synchronous motor drives it. Unlike K-
1926127, the compressor has one cylinder for each compression 
stage and has its own independent knockout pot and intercooler 
system. The compressor running gear lubrication, cylinder 
lubrication, and jacket cooling water system are the same as the 
other two compressors. The third and fourth stage packing has a 
thermosyphon antifreeze cooling system. 
Because the three makeup compressors share common suction 
and discharge piping, the compressor inlet and outlet pressures are 
the same, and many varying control combinations are possible 
between the three to meet unit hydrogen demands. 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Compressor Performance History 
The three hydrogen makeup compressors, K-1926, K-1927, and 
K-2179 have experienced high historical failure rates when 
compared to other company and industry reciprocating 
compressors in similar services (Leonard, 1996). Failures have 
occurred on most of the compressor components at various times 
throughout their history, including valves, unloaders, piston rods 
and packing, piston rings and rider bands, crosshead assemblies, 
connecting rods, and main bearings. Table 1 lists the number of 
outages for each compressor from 1989 through 1993 (based on 
mechanical equipment data tracking that began in 1989). 
Historically, K-1926 has been the worst performer and K-2179 
the best performer, though still below best performing industry 
comparisons. By comparison, the eight reciprocating compressors 
in hydrogen service at a sister refinery average 2.2 outages per 
machine per year. 
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Table 1. Makeup Compressor Outage Data from 1989 to 1992. 
Year K-1926 K-1927 K-2179 Total 
Outa2es Outa2es Outa2es 
1989 6 5 2 13 
1990 3 3 2 11 
1991 5 4 4 13 
6 4 6 16 
The RCA team attempted to compile historical data back to the 
original installation of the machines. Some records were 
incomplete or missing during certain periods, so the data are not a 
complete representation of compressor performance. However, it 
is clear that the machines have performed poorly from the very 
beginning. In fact, there have been two fires due to second stage 
cylinder wrecks on K-1927. As a result of the fires and other 
significant events (cracks in the frame, fracture of cylinder anchor 
bolts, movement of the foundation), the third stage cylinders for K-
1926 and K-1927 were redesigned in June 1982 to reduce the rod 
loading on the second stage. No cylinder failures have occurred 
since the redesign, though poor overall reliability continued. 
Table 2 indicates the type of component failures that have been 
experienced over the last five years. These data are fairly 
consistent with historical performance. Valve failures have been 
the most predominant type of failure on all three machines. 
Table 2. Compressor Outages Per Machine by Component Type 
from 1989 to 1993. 
Component Average K-1926 K-1927 K-2179 Total 
Type Repair Time Repairs Repairs Repairs 
Valves Jll2-2 days 52 19 24 95 
Connecting rods 1-3 weeks 10 7 0 17 
Cross heads 7 days 10 0 I 1 1  
Piston rods 3-5 days 15 6 3 24 
Main bearings 5 weeks 0 I 0 1 
Packing 4days 12 1 4 17 
PM 3 days 1 1  14 18 43 
Other . 11 12 20 43 
Total 121 60 70 251 
Several attempts were made in the last few years to make 
improvements to the compressors. Some of the changes were 
premised on the theory that liquid slugs were causing most of the 
component failures. Other changes were made to return the 
machines to vendor recommended tolerances (historical damage 
led to out of tolerance components). Changes include: 
• Conversion from plate to poppet valves. 
• Installation of low point liquid traps on the suction lines of K-
1926127. 
• Replacement of cylinder/packing lube systems. 
• Installation of standard dimension crosshead components. 
• Line boring of K-1927 main bearing saddles. 
• Installation of pilot operated valves on K-2179 unloaders to 
replace Schrader shuttle valves. 
• Heat tracing and insulating the suction lines of K-1926127. 
• Installing a tempered cooling water circulation system on all 
compressor cylinders. 
The reliability of the compressors did not improve following the 
work performed during the February 1994 turnaround. K-1926 
performed particularly poorly, with multiple valve failures and two 
significant events to repair a main bearing failure and a packing 
case leak. K-2179 performed worse than prior history with 
multiple valve failures. K-1927's performance did not change 
much, with the fewest valve failures among the three machines. 
However, it did experience damage to its third stage piston rings 
and rider bands. 
Performance Demands 
Based on operating unit requirements, the Hz makeup 
compressors are expected to operate with an overall availability of 
95 percent, including preventative maintenance downtime. This 
equates to an average availability of 98.3 percent per compressor 
and comparable to the eight hydrogen reciprocating compressors at 
a sister refinery, which average approximately 2.2 outages per 
machine per year. It is also expected that compressor system 
maintenance costs will not exceed $300,000 per year or $100,000 
per compressor. 
Problem Impact 
The performance gap between expected and actual performance 
for the three makeup compressors is significant. Historically, the 
largest impact has been high maintenance costs due to frequent 
compressor outages and repairs. In 1993, compressor maintenance 
costs totaled $565,000, and $460,000 in 1994. High compressor 
repair costs also constrained maintenance spending in other areas 
of the unit, limiting overall reliability improvement opportunities. 
Historically, compressor downtime had minimal effect on 
production, since only two of the three compressors were needed 
for full capacity operation of the unit. In 1994, though, operating 
requirements for the compressors changed significantly. As a result 
of a debottleneck project completed in 1994, unit production 
capability increased, requiring additional hydrogen. Operation of 
all three compressors (at full or part load) was required to meet this 
additional hydrogen demand. 
During the peak of the 1994 gasoline season, lost opportunity 
costs for compressor downtime exceeded $10,000 per day per 
compressor. The production costs with two compressors down was 
estimated at $100,000 per day. A five-week outage to repair a main 
bearing failure on K-1926 in March 1994 resulted in $420,000 in 
lost production. A three-week outage to repair valves and a 
subsequent packing case leak on K-1926 in June 1994, cost about 
$200,000 dollars in lost production. There were several other 
outages of two to three days in length since the 1994 turnaround, 
and at times, the unit was down to one compressor operation. 
As a significant, secondary impact, the poor reliability of these 
compressors has negatively impacted the morale of personnel in 
the department, including operators, craftsmen, day staff, and 
support personnel. Due to the significant attention required by the 
makeup compressors, other opportunity areas have also suffered. 
In summary, the poor reliability of these compressors had a 
significant negative impact on unit operations and profitability 
since the startup of the unit. 
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS TEAM CHARTER 
The charter of the study team was to address the poor reliability 
of the three hydrogen makeup compressors using the root cause 
analysis process. Specifically, the team was chartered to: 
• Determine the root causes contributing to the poor compressor 
reliability. 
• Develop solutions to eliminate the causes affecting reliability. 
• Develop a long-term preventative maintenance and repair 
strategy to maximize compressor availability and minimize 
maintenance costs. 
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The RCA team was an eight member team composed of repre­
sentatives from different backgrounds with expertise in specific 
fields, including a facilitator knowledgeable in the RCA process. 
Team members included an operations foreman, process engineer, 
reliability engineer, mechanical equipment specialist, and 
mechanical equipment engineers. Two members were brought in 
from the corporate technology center and one from another 
refinery. 
ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
The reciprocating compressor problem presented a difficult 
analysis with a variety of component failures (valves, piston rings, 
bearings, crossheads, etc.) over a 30 year period. There were many 
fmnly held beliefs as to why the compressor reliability was so 
poor, yet there had been no significant performance improvements 
accomplished over a 30 year period. 
Due to the complexity of the problem, the team developed a 
strategy of separating the overall problem into "subanalyses" of 
very specific component failures and compressor incidents. This 
approach permitted the analysis team to execute rigorous 
investigations of several specific failures to ensure the 
identification of all of the underlying causes impacting compressor 
performance. 
Several failure events were selected and analyzed as representa­
tives of the whole to identify event root cause. Event root causes 
from the event analyses were compared to determine whether 
systemic or common causes existed. Identifying and addressing 
causes at the systemic level has the greatest impact on long term 
performance improvement. The individual events selected for 
analysis were: 
• K-192 6 main bearing failure-March 5, 1994 
• K-192 7  first stage valve failure-April 15, 1994 
• K-2 179 first and fourth stage valve failure-May 16, 1994 
• K- 192 7 third stage rider band/ring failure-March 2 6, 1994 
• K-192 6 first stage crosshead failure-October 6, 1993 
• K- 192 6 third stage packing case leak-June 6, 1994 
These six events were selected as representative of typical 
compressor failures. Selection criteria included frequency of 
occurrence, impact of failure, and independence of the events. 
As may be imagined with a problem of this duration and 
complexity, the completed results of the RCA are involved and 
voluminous. Only a very small percentage of the complete analysis 
detail may be incorporated in this paper. In order to provide a 
"flavor" of the analysis rigor, details of the K -192 7  first stage valve 
failure analysis (April 15, 1994) are included as the APPENDIX. 
COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS 
Upon completion of the specific event analyses, the RCA study 
team reviewed the fmdings for common causes (commonalties that 
are present in many or all of the incidents studied). Common cause 
analysis is perhaps the most important segment of the reliability 
study, because it identifies the underlying causes common to 
several distinct failure events and represents strategic findings for 
the unit area and plant. It is within the boundaries of these common 
causes that the various failure events and their magnitudes, which 
negatively impacted compressor performance, are explained. It is 
also possible that these causes are indicative of systemic problems 
that exist in other areas of the unit unrelated to the compressors. 
Elimination of common causes can have the greatest effect to 
improve makeup compressor reliability. The study team identified 
the following common causes responsible for the overall poor 
reliability of the compressors: 
• Poor valve reliability (negatively impacted other machine 
components) 
• Inadequate procurement process (allowed use of lesser quality 
component designs) 
• Inadequate repair practices/procedures (introduced errors that 
increased downtime) 
• Lack of experience with low frequency maintenance events 
(inadequate repairs) 
• Inadequate problem solving methods (problems not eliminated 
and downtime extended) 
• Poor communications between operations, engineering, and 
maintenance 
• Lack of long term focus (no overall compressor maintenance 
strategy, only reactive) 
• Lack of engineering design reviews (strict reliance on non-OEM 
vendor capability) 
• Inadequate performance monitoring (problems not detected 
early) 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The RCA team utilized the solution development process to 
develop and evaluate alternative solutions to eliminate the 
identified causes for poor compressor reliability. This process tests 
solutions based on a set of weighted criteria. Listed below is a 
compilation of the team's recommendations. The recommenda­
tions are categorized as either short term or long term. Under each 
category, the items are listed in general order of priority based on 
likely contribution to improve compressor reliability. 
Short Term Recommendations 
• Establish an operations/engineering/maintenance (0/E/M) 
surveillance team to monitor compressor performance, analyze 
compressor failures, review repair plans and proposed changes, 
address and communicate important issues-in general, to provide 
overall 0/E/M guidance on machine operation and reliability. 
• Develop/update all repair and PM procedures for the three 
reciprocating compressors. 
• Establish and maintain an ongoing relationship with equipment 
manufacturers, central engineering, and other locations for 
consultation on repair practices-particularly during low 
frequency maintenance events. 
• Install redesigned (designated Type 2 )  low- lift poppet valves in 
all three compressors. 
• Install pulsation suppression orifice plates in the suction and 
discharge nozzles of all three compressors. 
• Install continuous valve temperature monitoring equipment that 
will allow trending capabilities for troubleshooting valve 
problems. 
• Install permanent high temperature shutdown switches on all 
three compressors. 
• Reduce cylinder lubrication to optimum levels to reduce 
excessive oil impact on the valves. 
• Redesign unloader valves to minimize leakage. 
• Maintain detailed reliability tracking database for long term 
troubleshooting. 
Long Term Recommendations 
• Eliminate unloader valves by installing piping and controls 
between stages that will provide recycle control and allow the 
compressors to run fully loaded. 
• Install cylinder pressure valves in the cylinders of all three 
machines for permanent compressor performance monitoring 
(consider contracting Beta analysis monthly). 
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• Install permanent, welded-in orifice plates in the suction and 
discharge nozzles of all three compressors. 
• Upgrade compressor shutdown and monitoring instrumentation 
to provide additional protection to the compressors and improve 
troubleshooting capabilities. 
ASSESSMENT OF RCA PROCESS RESULTS 
Results Achieved 
A number of the recommendations have been implemented. A 
particularly successful implementation was the design and 
installation of Type 2 poppet valves. In addition, a pulsation issue 
was addressed through installation of orifices in the discharge of 
the compressors. Valve life ratcheted up to one year, then to two 
years, and there is one machine with valves that have been in 
operation over two years with no plans to change valves before 
four years of operation. 
Production losses during the first year of implementation were 
essentially zero, as compared with over three million dollars in 
1994. Compressor maintenance is now performed in periods of 
time with lessened production demands (when there is no 
production loss due to the shutdown of one compressor). 
Figure 1 shows the availabilities of these compressors for 1993 
through 1997. Figure 2 shows the maintenance spending for 1995 
through 1997. As shown, the improvement has been considerable, 
more than paying for the cost of the RCA study and the 
implementation of its recommendations. 
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Figure 1. Availabilities of Makeup Compressors from 1993 to 
1997. 
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Figure 2. Maintenance Costs of Makeup Compressors from 1995 
to 1997. 
There are still some of the longer lived hardware issues to 
address, particularly those that require components to be brought 
back to a design standard. As an example, the crosshead pins had 
been modified to work with oversize bores as a "fix" during past 
repairs. Return to standard dimensions required new connecting 
rods without overbore. 
An ongoing concern is that there may be "slacking off" of the 
attention paid to these machines. Due to the performance 
improvement, they are no longer at the top of the list of unit 
problems. This has not been an issue to date, but will require 
concentrated attention. 
RCA Difficulties 
Execution of a successful RCA is not easy. In this case, there 
were a number of barriers to overcome. Before the study was 
completed, the prevailing theory was that liquid carryover from the 
compressor knockout pots was the cause for the poor machine 
reliability. This "problem" had been addressed by several projects 
without success. With the liquid theory so well entrenched, it was 
suggested by some that the RCA study was not necessary, and 
would only validate liquids as the culprit for poor compressor 
reliability. Some team members and sponsors had difficulty 
leaving this perception of the problem. 
There was considerable time pressure on the participants. Just as 
the RCA effort was kicked off, two compressors shutdown, one 
requiring significant repairs. Lost production began to significantly 
impact unit profits and sponsors of the effort became impatient 
asking for immediate answers. Due to the complexity of the 
problem, this was an impossible request and impacted team 
performance and morale. 
These compressors were not equipped with cylinder pressure 
taps that would enable the team to capture online diagnostic 
information. With high quality data being the cornerstone of the 
RCA process, this presented a great challenge for the team to 
overcome. 
Component quality problems also threatened the analysis. 
During the cause verification stage, the team received an out of 
specification shipment of valve springs from a manufacturer. A 
series of failures confused the results until the quality problems 
were resolved. 
Reasons for Success 
In the end, the effort was a resounding success with compressor 
reliability dramatically improved. There were several reasons the 
RCA team was able to overcome the barriers and resolve the 
compressor reliability problems. A significant factor was the 
team's unwavering discipline and commitment to the RCA 
process. Although individuals and teams had made numerous 
attempts over the years, this was the first time a structured, 
rigorous analytical process like RCA had ever been applied to the 
problem. The analysis required a problem solving paradigm shift 
and the RCA process provided the framework for that shift. 
Ironically, the team found no evidence of liquid carryover affecting 
compressor performance. Applying the principles of RCA, the 
team was able to break through this paradigm and uncover the real 
underlying causes impacting the compressors. 
Incorporating individuals from outside the Norco plant on the 
RCA team was a critical factor in the success of the effort. These 
"outsiders" provided new ideas and a fresh perspective to a 
problem so familiar to the local team members. One of these ideas 
was the installation of a pressure port through the valves and valve 
covers, permitting the collection of critical diagnostic data. The 
diversity of the participants, from operations to engineering, also 
contributed greatly to the effort. For example, the operations 
representative on the team helped offset the "pro-liquid" members 
and designed some field tests to eliminate it as a possible cause. 
Although much pressure was placed on the team to find 
answers, the steering team came to the realization the problem was 
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difficult to resolve and afforded the team the time and resources to 
see it through. In total, the study lasted eight months and 
represented nearly one man-year of resource time. This 
unwavering support of time and resources gave the team the 
opportunity to be successful. 
Another factor that contributed to success was the cooperative 
relationship that the team created with the compressor 
manufacturer. Several workshops were held with the 
manufacturer's technical personnel participating with the RCA 
team members. This relationship strengthened the analysis process 
and allowed the team to quickly work through component quality 
problems. The manufacturer benefitted as well, as it improved its 
own internal processes and strengthened an important 
relationship. 
The analysis strategy also proved to be important. Investigating 
several independent component failures allowed the team to 
uncover numerous contributing causes that might have been 
missed if such a strategy had not been adopted. Not only did the 
team find mechanical design deficiencies, but numerous human 
system deficiencies were identified as well (i.e., procedures, 
practices, knowledge, communications, etc.). Correcting system 
deficiencies has greatest long-term potential as the learnings can be 
applied to other systems and equipment. 
CLOSURE 
In summary, the results of the RCA have been very profitable 
with a significant reduction in production losses (peak of over 
three million dollars to essentially zero) and maintenance costs 
(peak of over $600,000 in a year to less than $200,000). Problems 
with valves that had been in existence almost 30 years have been 
successfully eliminated. Poor performance that had been widely 
accepted as the "norm" has been corrected and a new performance 
paradigm established. The operating unit now "expects" these 
machines to perform whenever that performance is demanded. The 
expectation has gone from "not too many shutdowns" to "no 
shutdowns" outside of turnarounds. 
The application of RCA processes not only eliminated the 
immediate problem, but has been used to spread the learnings to 
improve other systems as well (Kepner and Tregoe, 1981; 
Stockholm, 1994; Perez, 1994). 
APPENDIX 
DETAILS OF AN ALYSIS OF K-1927 
FIRST STAGE VALVE FAILURE (APRIL 15, 1994) 
INTRODUCTION 
This section presents details of the RCA analysis of one of the 
six compressor failure events analyzed by the RCA team. The 
intent is to demonstrate the level of detail and rigor used in the 
RCA process to address this type of problem. 
SUMMARY 
On April 15, 1994, compressor K-1927 failed first stage west 
valves. Upon disassembly, two of the six head end valves were 
found with missing poppets. Failed poppet parts and excessive 
amounts of cylinder lubrication were also found. 
Root cause analysis techniques found the causes of this valve 
failure to be due to pressure pulsation and inadequate valve design. 
Pressure pulsation in excess of API recommendations and of 
proper frequency was measured at valve covers. An acoustical 
study conducted by a consultant found deficiencies in the original 
1965 acoustical design on K-1926 and K-1927 that permitted these 
pulsations to exist. Orifices were installed on K-1926 and pulsation 
levels dropped to acceptable levels. 
Cylinder pressure monitoring and a computerized dynamic 
valve analysis determined excessive valve lift and spring stiffness. 
Dynamic valve analysis was used to redesign poppet valves for K-
1926 and K-1927 with optimized springs and valve lift. Cylinder 
pressure monitoring verified proper valve movement on K-1926. 
Human system problems were noted that allowed poor valve 
performance to continue on the makeup compressors for 29 years. 
Problems such as lack of design reviews, lack of procurement 
specifications, lack of rigorous cause analysis, and inadequate use 
of technical consultation were the key systemic problems. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Expected Valve Perfonrtance 
Compressor valves in hydrogen service should have a one to 
three year life (time between replacement). Valve replacements 
should be able to be planned. Valve life should be predictable using 
cylinder pressure monitoring. This performance has been 
demonstrated in a similar company service, which had a 399 day 
mean time between failure (MTBF). 
Actual Valve Perfonrtance 
Valve repairs consist of the actual number of valves that were 
fixed. Table A-1 lists the number of valve repairs for the makeup 
compressors from 1989 to 1993. The total numbers of outages per 
cylinder may consist of one or more valve failures per cylinder. 
Table A-2 lists repairs per cylinder attributed to valve failures for 
the makeup compressors from 1989 to 1993. Actual compressor 
shutdowns may have multiple cylinders involved. Table A-3 lists 
makeup compressor shutdowns attributed to valve failures from 
1989 to 1993. 
Table A -1. Number of Valve Repairs for Makeup Compressors from 
1989 to 1993. 
K-1926 
1st stage East 18 9 22 18 29 96 
1st stage West 14 14 18 17 31 94 
2nd stage 2 13  12 0 14 41 
3rd stage 8 4 18 28 25 83 
K-1927 
1st stage East 0 12 4 6 9 31 
1st stage West 0 3 1 11 5 20 
2nd stage 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3rd stage 0 8 4 12 17 41 
K-2179 
1st stage 0 15 7 8 3 33 
2nd stage 0 5 3 9 6 23 
3rd stage 0 1 0 8 1 10 
4th stage 0 2 5 3 0 10 
Total 42 86 94 120 140 482 
Impact 
The maintenance cost for a typical valve change is 
approximately $1000. Since 1994, unit production loss due to one 
compressor being down is estimated at $10,000/day. Since it takes 
approximately 1.5 days to get a compressor back from a valve 
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Table A-2. Repairs Per Cylinder Attributed to Valve Failures for 
the Makeup Compressors from 1989 to 1993. 
I Comeressor I 1989 I 1990 I 1991 I 1992 I 1993 I Total I 
K-1926 
1st stage East 4 2 3 4 5 18 
1st stage West 2 2 3 4 3 14 
2nd stage 1 2 I 0 2 6 
3rd stage 1 1 4 5 4 15 
K-1927 
1st stage East 0 1 2 1 3 7 
1st stage West 0 2 I 3 I 7 
2nd stage 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3rd stage 0 I I 4 3 9 
K-2179 
I st stage 0 1 1 2 2 6 
2nd stage 0 2 I 4 4 11 
3rd stage 0 1 0 1 1 3 
4th stage 0 I 2 2 0 5 
Total 8 16 19 30 28 101 
Table A-3. Makeup Compressor Shutdowns Attributed to Valve 
Failure.fhnn 1989 to 1993. 
· 
I Comeressor I 1989 I 1990 I 1991 I 
K-1926 6 2 9 
K-1927 3 3 3 
K-2179 1 3 4 
Total 10 8 16 
1992 I 1993 I Total I 
8 7 32 
6 6 21 
5 7 20 
19 20 73 
failure, impact is estimated at $16,000 per outage. From 1989 to 
1993, the makeup compressors averaged 14.6 compressor 
shutdowns due to valve failures per year (25 day MTBF). With the 
1994 economic value, valve failures will result in several hundred 
thousand dollars of nonconformance per year. 
EVENT DESCRIPTION 
At 11:15 a.m., Friday, Aptil 15, 1994, compressor K-1927 
experienced a significant reduction in hydrogen flow. The 
compressor had been operating without problems for 
approximately three weeks. The suction pressures on both the 
second and third stages fell. Three first stage head end valves were 
noted as running hot. The first stage west discharge temperature 
had elevated from 270°F to 350°F. The machine was stopped and 
a valve repair was scheduled for the first stage west cylinder. 
Figure A-1 identifies the valve locations on the cylinder. Upon 
disassembly of the first stage west head end valves, the following 
observations were made: 
• Valve #13: Relatively oily. Leak checked OK. 
Temperature before: 1 OSOF 
Temperature after: l15°F 
K-1927 
1st Stage 
West 
Valve Locations Looking North 
Figure A-1. Location o.f Valve on K-1927 First Stage West Cylinda 
• Valve #14: Same as #13. A piece of a broken poppet from 
another valve is lodged on the cylinder side of this valve. 
Temperature before: 99°F 
Temperature after: 114 oF 
• Valve #15: Unloader valve. Oily, but all poppets in place. Two 
out of the 12 poppets leaked slowly. 
Temperature before: l72°F 
Temperature after: 251 °F 
• Valve # 16: Some black residue found around center poppets. 
Three outside poppets initially leaked slowly, but sealed after 
being solvent washed. 
Temperature before: 244 oF 
Temperature after: 314 oF 
• Valve #17: One poppet and spring found missing on outside 
ring. Found one piece of a broken poppet stnck on the cylinder 
side. One complete spring was found stuck between the top of the 
poppet and the seat, and a piece of another spring was found stuck 
in the same position on another poppet. Seven of the 17 poppets 
had grooves cut around the outside of the poppets, probably from 
pumping against springs. This valve was not leak checked, because 
it would have leaked. 
Temperature before: 254°F 
Temperature after: 332°F 
• Valve #18: One poppet and spring missing. Valve was oily, but 
had no debris. No foreign object damage to poppets. 
Temperature before: 106°F 
Temperature after: I 07°F 
Note: Thennocouple was assumed not accurate on valve #18. 
From this information, the following failure scenario was derived: 
• A discharge spring fails in valve #18. 
• Due to the spring failure, the poppet fractures and comes out of 
the valve holder. 
• The broken spring pieces fall into #17. 
• The pieces cause a poppet to fail in valve #17. 
• In addition to the failed poppet on #17, seven other poppets are 
damaged. 
Figures A-2 and A-3 show the type of damage experienced on the 
valves. 
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Figure A-2. Poppet Valve with Failed Poppets. (Note the poppets 
at locations 5:00, 6:00, and 7:00. You can see where springs have 
"rolled over" the head of the poppets, causing indentations. 
Poppet at location 11:00 is missing. ) 
Figure A-3. Poppet Valve Cover Showing Damaged Springs. 
(Springs had extended and gotten under the heads of the poppets. ) 
PROBABLE CAUSES 
The two primary component level causes that led to the valve 
failure on K-1927 are pressure pulsation and inadequate valve 
design. Numerous other human system problems led to these 
component level causes. It should be noted that various tests were 
run on K-1926 instead of K-1927. Information derived from K-
1926 is assumed to be representative of K-1927, since the 
compressors are identical and have common inlet and discharge 
systems. Either the poppet pushed through the seat or the poppet 
broke apart causing the poppet failure in valves #17 and #18. The 
detailed assessment leading to these conclusions can be 
summarized in the failure tree: 
I. Excessive loading 
lA. Pulsation 
IB. Normal impact force 
IC. Spring failure 
ID. Late poppet liftoff 
IE. Valve flutter 
IT. Inadequate strength of poppet material 
III. High temperature 
iliA. High base design temperature 
ITIB. Internal gas recycling from leaking poppets 
IIlC. Internal gas recycling from leaking unloaders 
Details of these components follow: 
lA. Pulsation 
Normal valve action can be upset by pressure pulsation. 
Pulsation is caused by flow through various piping geometries. 
Factors such as relative speed of sound, gas velocity, and 
compressor speed determine the level of pulsation present. 
Pulsation can cause late valve closing and valve slamming into 
seats. Piping changes and orifice plates can eliminate pulsation. 
Figure A-4 gives an illustration of pulsation on discharge valves. 
Figure A-5 shows evidence of pulsation on K-1926 third stage. 
DISCHARGE VALVE 
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EFFECT OF DISCHARGE PULSATION 
Figure A-4. Effect of Discharge Pulsation. 
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Figure A-5. K-1926 Third Stage PV Card (July 1, 1994). 
Pulsation contributed to excessive loading. These pulsations 
were measured at the valve covers on K-1926 on July 1, 1994. 
Cylinder pressure monitoring found that valve movement was in 
phase with pressure pulsation (Figure A-5). A pulsation study 
verified that the pulsation at the valves was of correct frequency 
and sufficient amplitude to effect valve performance (Figure A-6). 
This pulsation was the result of the combination of physical 
dimensions, running speed of K-1927, and the acoustical 
properties of hydrogen at the pressures and temperatures in K-
1927. Classical pulsation problems normally occur in downstream 
piping where they cause the piping system to vibrate excessively. 
Pulsation bottles address these. This pulsation occurred between 
the valve and nozzle. Prior to the root cause analysis, pulsation was 
not considered as a cause, since there were no known piping 
system problems. 
A pulsation study had been conducted on K-1926 and K-1927, 
prior to installation. In the time at which the study was done 
(1960s), hardware limitations on the system used to model the 
system had the potential to overestimate the damping in nozzle 
resonances, thus underestimating the problems that may be caused. 
A second pulsation study conducted in August 1994 confirmed this 
and clearly identified the problem. 
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Figure A-6. K-1926 Discharge Pulsation Amplitudes Measured 
July 13, 1994. (From top left, first stage east, first stage west, 
second stage, third stage.) 
lB. Normal Impact Force 
Normal impact force contributed to excessive poppet loading. 
The impact force is related to the valve lift, which is a basic valve 
design parameter. Greater lift requires the poppet to achieve 
greater acceleration than lower lifts. This greater acceleration 
generates larger impact forces when the poppet hits the valve seat. 
Common valve lifts in hydrogen service range from 0.040 inch to 
0.070 inch. The failed poppets had a lift of 0.220 inch. The poppet 
valve lift was too large for hydrogen service. 
/C. Spring Failure 
Excessive poppet results from spring failure. Springs provide a 
dampening force when the poppet is opening, and aids in closing 
the poppet. If the spring fails, poppet movement is controlled only 
by ditierential pressure. Loss of the spring will increase the nonnal 
forces imposed on the poppet. As noted above, the normal spring 
force is already high due to the high valve lift. Additionally, after 
poppet failure, springs will become lodged in other poppets 
attempting to seat and cause them to fail. 
K-1927 springs were fatigued from too many cycles and 
resonance. The springs were made of Inconel, which has lower 
fatigue strength compared with other spring materials such as 
chrome silicon and Hastelloy C-276. The poppets fluttering caused 
additional cycles. Fluttering is caused by spring being too strong 
and/or valve lift being too high. Fluttering was proven on the sister 
compressor K-1926 by cylinder pressure monitoring. 
!D. Late Liftoff 
The poppets on K-1927 were opening late. The poppets opening 
late caused excessive loading, due to the additional acceleration 
needed to open the valve in a shortened period of time. The added 
acceleration results in an increased impact on the valve seat, 
similar to high valve lift. 
Late opening is caused from excessive spring stitiness and 
stiction. Stiction occurs when the poppet must break the suction 
force from excess cylinder lubrication. At the time of the failure, 
the cylinders were being overlubricated, dne to the optimization of 
a new cylinder lubrication system. Due to a new cylinder 
lubrication system that was installed during the 1994 unit 
turnaround, cylinder lubrication had not been optimized. This was 
apparent from the inspection of the failed valves on K-1927. In 
determining optimal lubrication rates, overlubrication is preferred 
over underlubrication. No iterations had been made in optimizing 
the cylinder lubrication rates between the turnaround and the valve 
failure. 
IE. Valve Flutter 
Cylinder pressure monitoring identified excessive valve flutter 
that was an indication of inadequate valve design. The poppet 
valves that failed in K-1927, which exhibited this flutter, had 
improper spring stiffness and excessive valve lift. Both of these led 
to the poppets moving many times during a crank rotation, or 
fluttering. It was also seen that many of the valves did not fully 
open. The design that failed appeared to have been designed for 
efficiency, not reliability. 
I/. Inadequate Strength of Poppet Material 
The poppets are made from a plastic material called poly­
etheretherkeytone, or PEEK. In production, the poppets are 
injection molded. The poppets that failed on K-1927 were 
fabricated from a low grade PEEK with poor molding process. 
The failed poppets were manufactured by injecting resin and 
glass fibers at the corner of the poppet seat, as shown in Figure A-
7. By injecting the resin [illd fibers at this point and in this 
direction, the glass fibers must turn a corner to fill the mold. 
---I �-
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Figure A-7. Type 1 Poppet ll�iection Point. 
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To prove that the failed poppets had a lower strength than other 
poppets, a test was conducted at the plant central shop. At 200°F, 
the Type 1 poppets had 65 percent of the strength of the Type 2 
poppets. 
l/1. High Temperature 
The poppet press test showed that Type I poppets had a half 
strength at l72°F. Type 2 poppets had a half strength at 250°F. 
These strengths reduce exponentially as temperatures elevate to 
300°F and higher. In K-1927, there are several factors that cause 
temperatures approaching 300°F in the first stage: 
IliA. High Base Design Temperature 
K-1927 is a three-stage compressor. Three stage compressors 
have a lower initial cost. Three stage compressors were also 
common in the 1960s. However, a three-stage compressor has 
higher design discharge temperatures due to greater required 
compression ratio per cylinder. By comparison, K-1927 (three­
stage) has a base first-stage discharge temperature of 290°F 
compared with K-2179 (four-stage) base temperature of 204°F. 
Table A-4 displays the base design temperature by stage for the 
makeup compressors. 
/liB. Internal Gas Recycling from Leaking Poppets 
During compression, gas is heated. In compressors, this heat is 
dissipated in heat exchangers mounted between the various stages. 
If the suction poppets do not seat properly, discharge gas can 
escape through the suction valve and reenter the cylinder without 
being cooled. Likewise, discharge valves not seating properly will 
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Table A-4. Base Design Temperature by Stage for the Makeup 
Compressors. 
K-1926/27 K-2179 
1 st stage 290 ° F  204 °F 
2nd stage 24 1 op 202 ° F  
3rd stage 2 1 0 °F 1 86 °F 
4th stage NIA 1 87 °F 
admit heated discharge gases back into the cylinder. If either valve 
has gas leaking past, the cylinder will begin to heat up. 
Solid particles will cause the poppets not to seat properly. Gas 
contaminants such as chlorides or rust, scale, and grease can cause 
poppets to not seat properly. 
III C. Internal Gas Recycling from Leaking Unloaders 
To control total compressor flow, a controlled leak path is built 
into compressors. These are called unloaders. Unloaders are 
mounted on each end of a cylinder. Unloaders consist of a large 
plug that can either be held into a seat or rest some distance away 
from the seat. If the plug is seated, the cylinder is pumping gas 
and is "loaded." If the plug is not seated, gas is free to pass back 
and forth through the unloader port and no compression takes 
place. 
When unloaders do not seat properly, heated gases will leak past 
the plug and be recycled. This is very similar to leaking suction 
valves. Makeup compressor unloaders have suffered from port 
alignment problems and inadequate guide ring clearances. Both of 
these problems occur commonly due to no preventative 
maintenance schedule for the unloaders. 
HUM AN SYSTEM ISSUES 
Valve failures have plagued the makeup compressors since 
original installation in 1965. It was not until recently that a large 
economic impact was seen from the failures. It is uncommon for a 
problem to exist for 2 9  years without remedy. Numerous human 
system issues allowed the long existence of the valve problems. 
• Design review of replacement valves not comprehensive or 
detailed enough-The design review conducted on the poppet 
valves prior to compete installation in K-192 7 was neither 
comprehensive nor complete enough. The reputation of the poppet 
valve design benefitted from both acceptable run lengths in smaller 
compressors (with a history of valve problems) and a lower repair 
cost compared with plate valves. A more comprehensive design 
review should have surfaced issues found in the root cause 
analysis, such as excessive valve lift, high spring stiffness, and 
pulsation. 
Poppets operated successfully for approximately six weeks in 
the third stage of K-192 7 in late 1993. However, no measurement 
criteria were established that would permit positive identification 
of the poppet performance as successful for improving compressor 
reliability. It was impossible to determine if the Type 1 poppet 
valves were successful based on six weeks operation. However, the 
decision was made to change all stages of K-192 7  to poppet valves 
at the 1994 unit turnaround. 
Skill in valve design is not an expectation of company 
machinery engineers. It is common to rely on vendors for selection 
and design of valves. However, design reviews should be 
conducted to establish the criteria utilized by a vendor in 
recommending a design and to establish criteria to identify whether 
the design is successful. 
• Lack of proper cause analysis-Through the history of valve 
failures that began in the 1960s, the problem has never been 
addressed by a rigorous cause analysis. There was limited data 
gathering to detail the failure history of the valves. There was also 
a limited incentive to address the poor valve performance. This 
was due to the idea that there was always a "spare" machine, and 
unit operations was accustomed to spending large maintenance 
dollars to keep two of the three machines running. 
Proper cause analysis takes training and resources. Due to the 
lack of economic incentive, the resources were never dedicated to 
address the problem. Additionally, training to learn the problem 
solving skills was required. It was common to manage the problem 
rather than fix it. Thus, the opportunity to develop skills in problem 
solving techniques was limited. 
Lack of proper cause analysis permitted a bias that liquids were 
the cause of valve problems to exist. This theory was widely 
accepted, limiting the perceived need for a more comprehensive 
analysis. 
• Procurement process inadequate-Major, critical machinery 
components should be procured from a predetermined acceptable 
list of parts and suppliers. These parts should be supplied to a 
design and/or performance criteria established by the original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) or a supplier with the design and 
quality capabilities comparable or superior to the OEM. Over the 
life of the makeup compressors, replacement parts from a variety 
of sources made their way into the machine. An example of this is 
the failed poppet valves provided by Type 1 products. Investigation 
into Type 1 products revealed that they have most of their valve 
design experience in gas pipeline applications, with limited design 
skill in hydrogen services. An acceptable supplier list should not 
have included them for this service. 
Further investigation revealed that there were no valve 
acceptance criteria. Procurement processes must be in place to 
force careful scrutiny of aftermarket part vendors, and acceptable 
vendor databases for components should be created and 
maintained. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Decision Statement: Achieve a mean time between repair 
(MTBR) on K-192 6 and K-192 7 of one year minimum. 
Structured solution development and subsequent risk analysis 
was done to determine the importance of various recommenda­
tions. From this structured solution development, the following 
items were recommended (in rank order): 
1. Establish a unit reciprocating compressor surveillance team. 
The team should have operations, engineering, and maintenance 
input. They should provide daily surveillance, monitor 
performance, and provide input into repair work. 
2 .  Install Type 2 redesigned valves in all stages of K-192 6 with 
followup cylinder pressure monitoring. The redesigned valves will 
meet specific success criteria that address a one year MTBR. The 
valves will also correct the design deficiencies, such as excessive 
valve lift and spring stiffness. Cylinder pressure monitoring will be 
used to trend valve performance for three months. If, after three 
months, cylinder monitoring shows valve performance similar to 
the original installation, pursue installing redesigned Type 2 valves 
on K-192 7. 
Redesigned Type 2 valves were installed in K-192 6 on 
November 4, 1994, except for the first stage discharge. Cylinder 
pressure monitoring taken one week later revealed improvements in 
valve motion. An example of this is shown in Figure A -8 that shows 
a reduced noise trace following the installation of the new valves. 
3. Valve pulsation elimination. Install orifice plates to eliminate 
valve pulsation. These orifices were recommended from an August 
1994 acoustic study of K -192 6 and K -192 7 done by an engineering 
consultant. 
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Figure A-8. Cylinder Noise Trace of K-I926 First Stage East and 
West. Before and After Type 2 Installation. 
These orifices were installed on K-1926 in October 1994. 
Noticeable decreases in pulsation levels were recorded. See Figure 
A-6 for preorifice pulsation levels and Figure A-9 for postorifice 
pulsation levels. 
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Figure A-9. K-I926 Discharge Pulsation Amplitudes Measured 
October 28, I 994. (From top left, first stage east, first stage west, 
second stage, third stage. ) 
4. Install continuous valve temperature monitoring equipment. 
This equipment will capture and record valve cover temperatures 
every minute. This will aid in troubleshooting valve problems. 
5. Consider designating a complex reciprocating compressor 
inspector. This inspector should have specialized training for 
reciprocating compressors, and provide technical assurance to 
repair and preventative maintenance programs. 
6. Review and revise valve repair procedure. 
7. Redesign or purchase new loader valves. These unloaders 
should minimize gas leakage. 
8. Review and optimize cylinder lubrication. This reduction will 
help eliminate stiction. 
9. Consider designating a complex reciprocating compressor 
repair crew. They would require specialized training and additional 
tools. Their purpose would be to reduce repair induced failures. 
10. Establish an ideal loading strategy. Running cylinders 
unloaded for long periods of time causes cylinder lubrication to 
collect. This collected oil can damage the valves. The machines 
should remain as fully loaded as possible. 
11. Continue with root cause analysis efforts. Although valve 
failures consist of approximately 80 percent of compressor 
downtime, other component failures should be analyzed. Valve 
failures cause added loads on other compressor components, so life 
of these components is expected to increase as valve life increases. 
Also, K-2179 is a four-stage machine and may have separate 
causes from K-1926 and K-1927. 
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